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SELF-SELECTION IN THE STATE SCHOOL SYSTEM
Donald Robertson and James Symons
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider the implications of the proposition that the level of
achievement of children in schools is completely determined by their own quality
and the quality of their peers in the school. We shall not specify what we mean by
‘quality’ here but we have in mind both intellectual ability and other characteris-
tics such as ambition, docility, punctuality and so on, which we believe are derived
in large part from the child’s home environment. The view that performance in
schools is largely unrelated to any characteristics of schools other than the quality
of the students in the school was popularised by the Coleman Report (1966). For
a comprehensive review of this literature, see Hanushek (1986). Recently Card
and Krueger (1992) have presented evidence that conventional school inputs such
as class size and teachers’ wages are important in the attainment of children. This
issue is largely irrelevant to the substance of this paper: all we need to take from
the literature is that the peer group is important.1
Therefore let us assume that children arrive at school endowed with a single
index of quality. The increase in quality produced by the school experience de-
pends on the average quality of the individual’s peer group. At once a welfare
question emerges: is it better to mix children’s qualities in schools, or should one
educate them in groups segregated by quality?
In this study social welfare will be represented essentially by the sum over
children of attainments on exit. This is not uncontentious. Most societies seek
to create elites and if the peer group model is accepted, this will be done best by
constructing at least some elite schools. However our concern is with the broad
admissions policy of the state school system (not with the creation of research
scientists or …eld marshals) and a utilitarian objective function seems appropriate
here. If this is taken as given, optimal social policy depends on whether there
are increasing or decreasing returns to peer groups in raising child quality. With
decreasing returns it is fairly clear that one should mix children; with increasing
returns one should segregate them into ability cohorts. Optimal policy thus turns
on the empirical question. Henderson et al (1978) found that average class IQ
showed diminishing returns in a study of the attainment of third grade children
in the United States. Robertson and Symons (1995) show that average socioeco-
nomic ratings of classmates showed diminishing returns on tests administered to
British 11 year olds. Diminishing returns seem likely on a priori grounds, though
1Though see Evans et al.,1992 for arguments that empirical estimates of peer group e¤ects
may be overstated.
to make this case we would have to penetrate the peer group black box to establish
behavioural causations.
In any case, we shall assume diminishing returns. We …nd below that mixing is
then socially optimal, but there are some caveats. These arise because we consider
dynamic aspects of a school i.e. that it is composed of a number of cohorts,
youngest to oldest. Once one thinks of a school in this way, the appropriate peer
group for an entrant child consists of all the children presently in the school plus
all who will arrive subsequently while he or she is there.
We consider what happens in this framework when, contrary to the outcome
being determined by a social planner, schools and children are free to seek each
other out: we call this a free-matching equilibrium. We are able to show that, in
what we consider is the most natural model, the free-matching equilibria give rise
to perfect segregation i.e. children are sorted into schools by quality. However
our analysis does throw up some rather odd sunspot-type equilibria wherein some
mixing does occur. Finally we show that perfect segregation is the worst possible
welfare outcome.
Thus, caveats aside, we show …rst that perfect mixing is the best in welfare
terms; second that the free matching-produces perfect segregation; and third that
perfect segregation is the worst possible welfare outcome. This occupies the next
section. In Section 4 we show that the competitive solution in which students pay
fees to schools (or receive inducements from them) achieves the optimal solution
of perfect mixing. The …nal section of the paper concludes with a brief discussion
of the implications of these results.
2. The Framework
Each period a cohort of children is to be admitted to a system comprising n
schools of identical size. Children remain at school for m years. We assume the
incoming cohort at date t is represented by -t = (-; t) where - is the unit interval
[0;1]. Equip - with the Lebesgue measure ¹ . Each child ! 2 - has an associated
quality q(!) where q : - ! <+ is an increasing measurable function with …nite
integral. Thus it is implicit that the distribution of qualities does not change
over time. An assignment of children to schools is a partition f-itg of -t into
disjoint measurable subsets of equal measure (= 1=n). We think of -it as the
cohort entering school i at time t. De…ne for Z µ -
I(Z) =
Z
!2Z
q(!)d¹(!) (2.1)
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De…ne also qit = nI (-it) and ¹q = I(-). Then
n¹q =
nX
i=1
qit (2.2)
is independent of t. The number qit is the average quality of children admitted to
school i at time t, while ¹q is the average quality of children in the population.
Let A be the set of vectors in <n with coordinates qi = nI(-i); i = 1; :::; n;
where f-ig ranges over all possible decompositions of - into measurable subsets
of equal measure. The set A thus represents all average quality vectors achievable
by assignments of children to schools. Let mi = nI(Ji); i = 1; :::; n where Ji
is the interval (i ¡ 1=n; i=n]. The following characterisation of the set A will be
useful below. The proof is given in an Appendix.
Proposition The set A of average quality vectors achievable by assignments
of children to schools forms a convex polyhedron in <n with vertices given by all
permutations of the coordinates of the vector (m1; :::; mn).
A school system may be represented by a tableau in which rows corresponds
to schools and columns give the average qualities of admitted children. In the
example in Figure 1 we assume that each of two schools contains, at any one
time, two cohorts of children, one just admitted and one admitted in the previous
period.
Figure 1
A School System
time ::: t ¡ 1 t t+ 1 :::
school 1 ::: 1 2 1 :::
school 2 ::: 2 1 2 :::
At t, school 1 has one older cohort of average quality 1 and a newly admitted
cohort of average quality 2. vice versa for school 2. Next period the box moves
one unit to the right and the enrolment changes. Note that the sum of the columns
is constant, re‡ecting our assumption that the quality distribution does not change
over time.
Students are assumed to rank schools by the quality improvements they o¤er,
determined by the peer group. We shall assume quality improvements are a
function of the weighted average
Vit =
mX
r=¡m
wrqit+r (2.3)
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where wr ¸ 0 for all r. The set fqit¡1; :::; qit¡mg is the average qualities of
children in school i when a new cohort is admitted, while fqit+1; :::; qit+mg refers
to those who will come subsequently while the cohort is in the school. In the main
we shall assume perfect foresight so there are no expectational considerations.
Usually we shall assume the weights are tent-shaped i.e. the function r ! wr is
non- decreasing for negative r and non-increasing for positive r. This means that,
in forming a valuation of a school, a student values less the qualities of students
with whom he or she will spend less time. In the event that wr = 0 for r > 0
we shall say that the weights (or the system in general) are backward-looking. In
the system exhibited in Figure 1, if students entering at t evaluate the quality of
those there when they arrive (including their own cohort) and the quality of those
who will arrive at t+ 1, with equal weights on the cohorts (normalised to sum to
unity), school 1 then has value Vit = 4=3 while school 2 has value 5=3.
Gains in quality on exit of a student entering school i at t are given by f(Vit)
where f is some concave function. Thus there are diminishing returns to school
quality. System-wide gain in aggregate quality is given by
nX
i=1
f (Vit) (2.4)
We assume social welfare at t is given by
Wt =
1X
s=t
(§ni=1f(Vis)) ¯
s¡t+m (2.5)
where 0 < ¯ < 1 is a discount factor. At each date t a social planner should seek
an assignment of children to schools to maximise (2.5).
The welfare index W is a function of the matrix Qt = (qis); i = 1; :::; n; s =
¡m;¡m + 1; ::: i.e. Wt = W (Qt). Exploiting the concavity of f in (2.5) one
can easily show that W is a concave function of its matrix argument. De…ne a
collection Ui; i = 1; :::; n; of assignment matrices as follows: U1 = Qt; & Ur+1
is obtained from Ur by replacing the …rst row by the second, the second by the
third, etc. and …nally the nth row by the …rst. The Ui are thus obtained merely by
permuting the rows of Qt; so by symmetry of the welfare functionW (Ui) = W (Qt)
for all i. Since the set A in the above Proposition is convex, ¹Qt =
Pn
i=1 Ui=n is
also the matrix of an assignment. Moreover
W ( ¹Qt) ¸ [W (U1) + :::+W (Un)]=n
= W (Qt)
Thus an assignment at all dates which equalises across schools the average
quality of the incoming cohort is both feasible and optimal. We summarise the
above discussion in
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Theorem 1 There is a socially optimal assignment of children to schools in
which each school receives an incoming cohort of equal average quality. Thus the
valuations of all schools Vit are equal at each date.
If the function f is quadratic, f (V ) = V ¡ ®V 2; ® > 0; then, summing over
i; it is easy to see that
nX
i=1
f (Vit) = n(¹q¡ ®¹q2 ¡ ®V (Vit))
where V (Vit) is the variance of the numbers Vit; i = 1; :::; n. Since ¹q is constant
by assumption,
Pn
i=1 f (Vit) is maximised by minimising the variance of the school
valuations.
This optimal assignment need not be unique. As an example, consider again
the tableau in Figure 1 and extend it into the past and future by alternating 1s
and 2s in the rows. For the valuation function Vit = 12qit +
1
2qit¡1 (backward-
looking equal weights) the assignment produces equal valuations at all dates so
the variance is zero and this outcome is thus optimal for quadratic f (:).
A perhaps more realistic problem is to take the assignment of cohorts to schools
at dates earlier than t as given and to look for assignments at t and later to
maximise (2.5). For example in Figure 1 we could imagine the planner formulating
his policy at t, taking the assignment at t¡1 as given. In this case perfect mixing
(qis = 3=2 for i = 1; 2; s = t; t + 1; :::) does not produce an optimum for the
above valuation function: alternating 1s and 2s sets the variance equal to zero at
all dates, while mixing produces non-zero variance at date t.
We do not have general results in this case. For m = 1 (i.e. moving averages
of length 3) one can show, fairly trivially, that if the characteristic polynomial of
the moving average has a root inside the unit circle the optimal assignment will
converge to perfect mixing.
3. Free Matching
So much for the optimal assignment. We now consider what might happen if
schools and children are free to seek each other out. We must be quite careful
exactly what we mean by this. We assume that each child ranks schools on the
basis of the valuation Vit. In the event of draws on this basis, we imagine they are
resolved according to some arbitrary ranking of the schools such as the order in
the phone book. We shall refer to this as the prior ranking of schools and denote
it by Âp. Thus we have de…ned a ranking of schools at t by: i Âv j if and only if
Vit > Vij or Vit = Vij and i Âp j. Clearly Âv well-orders the set of schools.
We assume further that schools prefer students of higher quality, which might
follow because they are easier to teach, and thus are preferred by teachers, or
5
because school policy is determined by a board of parents who seek to increase
Vit for the bene…t of their own children.
Thus schools have preferences over children and children have preferences over
schools. This is a matching problem of the sort considered by Roth and Marilda
Sotomayor (1990). This theory typically considers two groups of agents (call them
schools and students). Each school has a preference ordering over students, vice
versa for students. In contrast to our case, di¤erent students (and schools) may
have di¤erent preferences. The key concept is the stable matching i.e. a pairing
of students and schools wherein the following never occurs:
(i) schools i and i0 are paired to students ! and !0, respectively;
(ii) i0 prefers ! to !0 and ! prefers i0 to i:
If (i) and (ii) were to hold, one says the pairing (i0; !) blocks the matching
(i; !), (i0; !0). It is argued that in considering possible outcomes of a matching,
attention should be restricted to stable matchings. Gale and Shapley (1962) have
given an algorithm for computing a stable matching for …nite sets of agents. In
general, stable matchings are not unique. In the event of common preferences
between schools and students, however, the stable matching is unique: the best
school gets the best student etc.
We wish to generalise the notion of stable matches to our context. De…ne an
assignment -it; i = 1; :::; n of children to schools at t as stable if i Âv j implies
there exist no Ei µ -it, Ej µ -jt where Ei and Ej have positive measure and
q(!j) > q(!i) for all !i 2 Ei; !j 2 Ej . The following is easy to prove:
Theorem 2 If -it; i = 1; :::;n is a stable assignment of children to schools at
t, the sets -it coincide, almost everywhere, with the subsets of the decomposition
of - = [0; 1] into the subintervals [0;1=n]; (1=n; 2=n]:::(1 ¡ 1=n;1].
Thus if we assume all assignments are stable, the best school automatically
receives the best tranche of students, the second-best the second-best tranche,
and so on. In this case we may treat each ability tranche as if it were a single
unit and, in the valuation of a school by formula (1), the numbers qit are the time
invariant means of the ability tranches of -.
We wish to restrict somewhat further our family of admissible assignments.
What we wish to exclude is the possibility that the current cohort arriving at
a school could do better by going to another school who would be prepared to
have them in place of their existing arriving cohort. For example consider a …nite
cohort of students and assume the quality of the top cohort is so high that any
school they choose is the best by the Âv criterion. Assume the cohort is large and
the Âv ordering is unchanged by a single defection. Then any choice by the top
cohort can be part of a stable matching. In these circumstances it is plausible that
the top tranche will spontaneously choose the top school since this will lead to
a Pareto improvement for all their members over any other choice (c.f. Harsanyi
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and Selton (1988)).
In our context we de…ne as assignment as Pareto-consistent if whenever
qit > qjt then
Vit ¸ Vjt ¡ w0qjt +w0qit
with equality only if i Âp j. The term on the right in the above inequality is the
valuation of school j if its current cohort is replaced by -it. De…ne
V ¤it = Vit ¡ w0qit (3.1)
i.e. the value of school i excluding the arriving cohort; and de…ne i Â¤ j to mean
V ¤it > V ¤jt or V ¤it = V ¤jt and i Âp j . Then our de…nition of Pareto-consistency
is equivalent to the statement that qit > qjt implies i Â¤ j . Among the set of
stable assignments qit > qjt is equivalent to i Âv j; so Pareto-consistency asserts
precisely that i Âv j implies i Â¤ j. In these circumstances the two orderings
Âvand Â¤ are the same.
Call an assignment free matching if it is both stable and Pareto-consistent.
We summarise the foregoing discussion as:
Theorem 3 A free matching assignment matches the jth quality tranche with
the jth school according to the Â¤ ordering.
A free matching equilibrium is an assignment of children to schools -it; i =
1; :::; n which is free matching at all dates t. We wish to characterise the set of
free matching equilibria.
The problem is complicated by the fact that the ranking of schools depends
on the future as well as the past. If valuations are backward-looking, however, we
have a simple result. De…ne perfect segregation as an assignment of children to
schools in which schools are composed, at all times, of the same quality tranches
(up to sets of measure zero).
Theorem 4 If valuations are backward looking, the free matching equilibria
are perfectly segregated.
Proof If V ¤it is the valuation of school i according to (3.1), we have
V ¤it = w1qi t¡1 + :::+ wmqi t¡m
from which it follows that
V ¤it+1 ¡ V ¤it = w1qit + qit¡1(w2 ¡ w1) + :::+ qit¡m+1(wm ¡ wm¡1) ¡ wmqit¡m
¸ w1(qit ¡ qm)
where qm is the maximum of the qit (i.e. the average quality of the top tranche).
Note that the above inequality makes use of the monotonicity of the weights.
It thus follows that if i is the best school at t, so that qit = qm, its *-valuation
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increases or stays the same. Now the set of all possible *-valuations is …nite, so
the sequence of *-valuations of the best school must attain its upper bound and
stay constant henceforth. Consider the best school at s after the upper bound is
attained. At s+ 1 it is possible that another school could have equal *-valuation,
in which case we would have to appeal to the Âp ordering of schools to resolve who
is now the best. If no such school emerges within m periods of s then the original
school becomes the unambiguous best, for then it would be populated entirely by
qm cohorts and its *-valuation would strictly dominate all others. If such a school
does emerge and stands higher on the Âp ranking, either it remains the best for m
periods or is supplanted by another still higher on the Âp ranking. But the number
of schools is …nite so this procedure must stop in a …nite time. Thus, eventually,
a school emerges which remains the best forever. Once this happens the best
school and the best students e¤ectively disappear from the analysis. We may now
consider the second-to-top school and show that it will eventually be populated
exclusively by the second top tranches. Thus after a …nite time, the schools are
perfectly segregated. Clearly it is possible to produce a bound on the number
of periods it takes for this to happen which is independent of the initial date t.
To complete the proof we need to show that perfect segregation always obtains,
rather than eventually. But this is obvious since the time to perfect segregation
is bounded: if some part of the assignment were not perfect segregation, it would
be enough to consider a su¢ciently early t to obtain a contradiction.
Corollary to Proof If a backward-looking system becomes free matching at
some date, it evolves towards perfect segregation in …nite time.
Theorem 4 is a little more subtle than it looks and is overturned if we remove
some seemingly innocuous assumptions. Consider …rst the assumption that the
distribution of qualities of the incoming cohort of students is constant over time
i.e. the quality function q(:) is time invariant. Consider two schools, comprising
three cohorts (m = 3) with the tableau
School 1 ::: 10 10 :1 :1 :001 :001 :::
School 2 ::: 1 1 :01 :01 :0001 :0001 :::
Assume the *-valuation gives equal weights to the two senior levels. Then the
pattern in the above tableau is consistent with the best children being allocated
to the best school: but the best school cycles over time.
Consider next our assumption that the weight function is monotonic. Consider
as before a two- school, three-level system with tableau
School 1 ::: 1 0 1 0 1 0 :::
School 2 ::: 0 1 0 1 0 1 :::
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If the *-valuation attaches a weight of unity to the top level and zero to the lower
level (the little boys love only the big boys), then the tableau is consistent with
the best school receiving the best tranche. Once again, the top school cycles over
time.
We now turn attention to the case of two-sided weights i.e. students take into
account future schoolmates as well as those currently observable.
Theorem 5 If there are two schools, the free matching-equilibria are perfectly
segregated.
Proof The problem is obviously invariant to an increasing a¢ne transforma-
tion of qualities so we assume that qit is 0 or 1. It then follows that
V ¤1t + V
¤
2t = 1 ¡ w0
for all t. By an argument given in Theorem 4, monotonicity of weights gives an
inequality:
(¤) V ¤it+1 ¡ V ¤it ¸ w¡1(qit ¡ 1) ¡ w1qit+1
The proof is completed by showing the following tableau is unobtainable:
::: t t + 1 :::
School 1 ::: 1 0 :::
School 2 ::: 0 1 :::
Assume it is. Then the following chain of inequalities holds
(¤¤) V ¤1t+1 ¸ V ¤1t ¸ V ¤2t ¸ V ¤2t+1 ¸ V ¤1t+1
The …rst follows by setting q1t = 1, q1t+1 = 0 in (¤). The second follows because
school 1 is preferred at t. The third follows because V ¤1t and V ¤2t sum to a constant
for all t and V ¤1t is larger at t + 1 than at t. The fourth follows since school 2 is
preferred at t + 1. The upshot is that the inequalities in (¤¤) are all equalities.
But since V ¤1t = V ¤2t and school 1 was chosen, it follows that school 1 is higher
on the prior ranking. This is at variance with V ¤1t+1 = V ¤2t+1 and school 2 being
chosen at t+ 1. The contradiction delivers the result.
For more than two schools, however, there is bad news.
Theorem 6 Assume equal weights. For more than two schools there are
non-segregated free matching equilibria.
Proof We exhibit such an equilibrium for the case n = 3.
School 1 ... 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 ...
School 2 ... 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 ...
School 3 ... 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 ...
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It can be easily checked that the numbers on either side of a 0 sum to 1, those
on either side of a 1 sum to 2 and those either side of a 2 sum to 3. Thus the
tableau is a free matching equilibrium of a system comprising two levels (lower
and upper) with equal weights assigned to current and future schoolmates. Higher
order examples (n > 3) may be obtained trivially by appending rows of constant
qit to this example. For example we could obtain a non-segregated tableau for
n = 4 by writing a row of 3s across the top of the existing tableau.
The tableau in Theorem 4 is not the only non-segregated free matching equi-
librium. In fact one can judiciously insert sections of the perfectly segregated
tableau. Consider:
School 1 ... 1 2 2 2 ... 2 2 2 1 ...
School 2 ... 2 1 1 1 ... 1 1 0 0 ...
School 3 ... 0 0 0 0 ... 0 0 1 2 ...
This tableau consists of three parts. The …rst and third are sections of the tableau
from Theorem 6. The middle is the segregated case. To resolve draws we assume
the prior ordering of schools is 1 Âp 2 Âp 3. It will be seen that this has produced
another free matching equilibrium.
These equilibria strike us as extremely arti…cial and suggest that, in a sense,
the model is under-determined. Clearly the area where the model is most de…cient
is in expectation formation. One escape is to assume that expectations of the
future depend on the past. If we assume that the expectation of future quality
in school i is a weighted sum of past qualities where the weights are positive
(past quality predicts future quality) and declining (proximate qualities are better
predictors) then we may substitute out the future values in (3.1) to obtain a V ¤
function with one-sided weights. An application of Theorem 4 then delivers perfect
segregation. Moreover expectations would be trivially correct. Thus we have:
Theorem 7 If expectations of future quality are formed as weighted aver-
ages of existing qualities with positive declining weights then the free matching-
equilibria are perfectly segregated and expectations are correct, ex-post.
Our …nal result shows that perfect segregation produces, in welfare terms, the
worst possible outcome.
Theorem 8 Perfect segregation minimises the welfare function Wt at each
date t:
Proof Consider the welfare index W as a function of an assignment vector
at t; W =W (q1t; :::; qnt), holding …xed arguments at other dates. The domain of
the restricted function is the convex polyhedron characterised in the Proposition
above. But a concave function de…ned on a convex polyhedron achieves a mini-
mum at some vertex, and, by the Proposition, these are segregated assignments
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with quality vectors (m1; m2; :::; mn) (and those obtained by permuting these co-
ordinates). It follows that a minimum of W = W (Qit) is obtained by segregated
assignments at each date. We complete the proof by showing that, among the
class of outcomes in which schools receive segregated assignments, the welfare
index is minimised when each school receives the same quality tranche at each
date.
Consider the term in (2.4) ,
Pn
i=1 f (Vis). We have
nX
i=1
f (Vis) =
nX
i=1
f
Ã mX
r=¡m
wrqi t+r
!
¸
nX
i=1
mX
r=¡m
wrf (qi t+r) (concavity of f )
=
mX
r=¡m
wr
nX
i=1
f (qi t+r)
=
mX
r=¡m
wr
nX
i=1
f (mi) (segregated assignments)
=
nX
i=1
f (mi) (§wr = 1)
It is now enough to note that this …nal term corresponds to an assignment where
each school i receives the mi quality tranche each period. This completes the
proof.
Theorems 1 and 8 show that perfect segregation is a global welfare minimum.
Theorem 7 and 5 give conditions under which free matching leads to perfect
segregation. If these conditions hold, then our results imply that letting children
and schools ‘seek each other out’ leads to the worst possible result.
4. Competitive Allocation
We consider now the e¤ects of allowing prices to enter the model i.e allowing
students to bid for places and schools to bid for students. Recently Rothschild and
White (1995) have shown that competitive prices can support e¢cient outcomes,
even when peer-group e¤ects are present, and we shall demonstrate this in our
context.
The school experience is in fact a con‡ation of two economic functions. Firstly
the student supplies factor services to his peer-group. Secondly the student is the
recipient of a portion of the factor services supplied by his peer-group. The key
point is that both of these activities can clearly be supported by competition when
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considered individually. It is thus natural to hypothesise that prices charging
for the net gain (services received less those delivered) will support the desired
outcome.
We abstract from dynamic considerations and consider a school i with the
aggregate production function y = af (¹qi) where a is the number on the school
roll and qi is the average quality of children at i. For this production function, the
marginal product of the quality q of a given student at i is f 0(qi)., which would
thus be the price of the factor input under competition. It would follow that
such an individual would be paid qf 0(¹q) in a regime of perfect mixing where here
¹q is the system-wide average quality. However all individuals in this school also
absorb bene…ts each of the value f (¹q). Under competition each will pay the same
for these bene…ts: and this must be ¹qf(¹q) if the total payments to the factors are
to equal the revenue raised. Consider therefore price given by the net payment of
an individual of quality q :
p(q) = (¹q ¡ q)f 0(¹q) (4.1)
Theorem 9 We assume the quality function f is properly concave, f 00 < 0.
With quality payments given by (4.1), under perfect mixing there are no incentives
for students to change schools, nor for other schools to be set up.
Proof A student of quality q gains
f (¹qs) ¡ (¹q ¡ q)f 0(¹q)
from attending school s of average quality ¹qs if fees are determined by (4.1):
Under perfect mixing ¹qs = ¹q for all schools so gains are equalised and students
are indi¤erent between schools.
With regard to setting up new schools, note that it is clear from the form of
(4.1) that all schools make zero pro…ts. This observation can be sharpened to
show that no new school, charging whatever it pleases, can make non-negative
pro…ts by charging net fees other than those given by (4.1). To see this, note that
a new school S must satisfy
f (¹qs) ¡ p! ¸ f (¹q) ¡ p(q(!)) (4.2)
for all pupils ! 2 S, where p! is the fee paid by each !. This condition ensures
that S ’s enrolment do at least as well as they might in the perfectly mixed schools.
A pro…t maximising new school will raise p! so that (4.2) binds. We thus have
p! = f (¹qs) ¡ f(¹q) + p(q(!))
= f (¹qs) ¡ f(¹q) ¡ (q(!) ¡ ¹q)f 0(¹q)
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If S is to make pro…ts, the average of this over students at S must be non-negative:
f (¹qs) ¡ f (¹q) ¡ (¹qs ¡ ¹q)f 0(¹q) ¸ 0
But if f is properly concave the left-hand-side has a maximum of zero for ¹qs = ¹q,
so that S is perfectly mixed, as required.
5. Concluding Discussion
A combination of parental choice and free selection of pupils by schools in the
state system will most likely lead to bad results: bad schools populated by the
worst students together with elite schools populated by the educational elite. In
our set-up transfer of children from the elite schools to the bad schools would
e¤ect a welfare gain, the losses of the elite being more than compensated by gains
to those in the worse schools. It is interesting to note that if parents and schools
are free to choose in the manner outlined above, the less information parents
have about schools the better (from society’s point of view). Information will
facilitate segregation. This is in contrast to the usual argument for the laissez-
faire, wherein choice leads to the good driving out the bad. In our simpli…ed
framework, these Darwinist possibilities are absent: the only di¤erence between
schools is their enrolment. Freedom to choose here leads to the worst result of
perfect segregation. Remarkably, however, allowing a little more choice - the
ability for schools to charge fees and maximise pro…ts - leads to the best result of
perfect mixing.
Whereas this may be construed as an argument for the provision of education
by unregulated competitive markets, it should be noted that the fee structure is
rather unappealing: the worst students would pay the highest fees. Thus in a
system of compulsory education we might well be seeking to extract large fees
from those least able to pay. In these circumstances the competitive solution
would clearly need to be supplemented by a scheme to enable the poor to pay
market fees. If the state were able to identify the least able and provide them
with some sort of dowry to o¤er prospective schools, the welfare optimum could
be achieved. In practice, means tested vouchers may approximate.
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APPENDIX
Proof of the Proposition:
Let B µ <n be the set of vectors q such that
(A.1)
sX
i=1
qi ¸
sX
i=1
mi (s = 1; :::;n¡ 1)
and
(A.2)
nX
i=1
qi =
nX
i=1
mi
where (q1; :::; qn) is any permutation of the coordinates of q.
First,we assert A = B. If q 2 <n is a vector of school means, then the in-
equalities in (A.1) follow because q(!) is an increasing function while the equality
(A.2) is trivial. Conversely let q 2 B; q = (q1; :::; qn). We wish to show that
q can arise from an assignment of children to schools. We prove this result by
induction. The result is trivial for n = 1; assume it is true up to and including
n¡ 1. De…ne
G(x) = nI( [x; x+ 1=n] )
for x 2 [0; 1]. Then G(0) = m1 and G(1 ¡ 1=n) = mn. Thus since m1 · q1 · mn
the Intermediate Value Theorem shows that nI(Z) = q1 where Z = [z; z + 1=n]
for some z with 0 · z · 1 ¡ 1=n.
We now only outline the proof. The interval S will meet at most two of the
sub-intervals [(j ¡ 1)=n; j=n]; j = 1; :::; n; see the Figure. As drawn S meets
[1=n; 2=n] and [2=n;3=n] and I(S) = q1 is the hatched area. The key idea is that
if the hatched area were to be removed , the function q(!) would remain increasing
and the problem would involve n¡1 subintervals, [1=n; 3=n]nS replacing [1=n; 2=n]
and [2=n;3=n]. All that needs to be done is to show that a version of (A.1) and
(A.2) will hold for the collapsed interval. This is obvious from the Figure.
We have shown that A = B i.e. the system (A.1) and (A.2) characterises the
set of vectors that can represent assignments. We shall have occasion to use a
slight generalisation of this result wherein the domain E of the function q is any
bounded measurable set in < and mi = I(Ei) for all i where fEig is an ordered
partition of E (i.e. a partition in which e1 < e2 < ::: < en for each ei 2 Ei) into
n subsets of equal measure.
To complete the proof let q be a vertex ofA and assume qi = I(Fi) i = 1; 2 are
two coordinates of q, the …rst say. Let E1, E2 be an ordered partition of F1 [ F2
with pi = I(Ei); i = 1; 2 and let C µ <n be the set of vectors obtained by
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swapping measure between F1 and F2, keeping constant the remaining ordinates
of q. By the ‘slight generalisation’ just discussed, this is the line segment joining
(p1; p2; q3; ::::qn) and (p2; p1; q3; ::::qn) in <n. Since q is a vertex it is now immediate
that p1 and p2 coincide with q1 and q2 in some order, so that F1 and F2 coincide
with E1 and E2, up to measure zero. Thus F1 and F2 form an ordered partition of
F1 [ F2: An extension of this argument shows that F1; F2::::Fn forms an ordered
partition of - = [0; 1]. Clearly the Fi must coincide, up to sets of measure zero,
with Ji.
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